






The Primacy of Function over Structure
Analogy Reading of Wittgenstein’s “Meaning is Use” Aphorism
Abstract
In the paper authors examine Wittgenstein’s standpoint “the meaning of a word is its use 
in an utterance” mainly in the context of sections 23 and 43 of the Philosophical	Investiga-
tions in the light of some other sections (namely 197–199, and 209), and some influential 
interpretations of these passages. They claim that “meaning is use” slogan is an analogy. 
Additionally, partially following Baker and Hacker 2005, authors argue that the standpoint 
is understandable only in the context of dependence of language-games on forms of life 
(wider interpretation). Namely, meaning of a word is its use in an utterance only if the use 
has a place in a life. In other words, in order to understand language-games it seems natu-
ral to observe them in their natural context of forms of life they belong to. Therefore, the 
claim “meaning is use” can be understood only as an analogy or a metaphor in precisely 






























ings	of	words	 (i.e.	 complete	 signs)	without	 their	uses	are	 like	“organic	ar-
chitecture”	without	“sense	of	use”	and	“organic	simplicity”	in	Frank	Lloyd	
Wright’s	dictum.	Words	are	alive	in	use,	and	in	use	they	have	their	meaning;	






topic	writes	 the	 following:	“By	 thus	distinguishing	 the	model–the	abstract,	
formal,	idealized	conception	of	a	language–from	the	issue	of	what	it	takes	for	
that	model	to	fit	sociological	reality,	we	give	ourselves	two	locations	where	
pragmatic	 considerations	may	 play	 a	 part.	 In	 the	 latter	 location,	 indeed,	 it	
seems	 that	 nothing	 but	 pragmatic	 considerations	 can	 be	 relevant.	 In	 some	
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(b)	 And	word’s	 use	 in	 a	LG	 is	 understandable	 only	 on	 the	 background	of	
a	FOL	(PI	23)	as	a	system	or	“a	frame	of	reference”	(OC	83).	Both	(a)	
and	(b)	are	indeed	the	ideas	explicitly	claimed	in	PI,	(a)	additionally	in	






























(c3)	 On	the	other	hand,	if	the	language	is similar to	an	instrument	(or	a	
toolbox),	and	if	words	are similar to	tools,	then	meanings	of	words	
are similar to	their	uses	(the	analogy	here	consists	of	similarity	be-




. Classical Aristotelian three-term metaphor scheme applied to the present issue 
SYNTHESIS	PHILOSOPHICA	
60	(2/2015)	pp.	(289–305)






















ing	“is”	use	 in	many	sections	besides	PI	43.	However,	 if	 it	 is	 true	 that	 the	




















More	 precisely,	 as	 linguistic	 phenomena,	 analogies,	 and	 especially	metap-
hors,	are	totally	immersed	and	completely	surrounded	by	non-linguistic	expe-
Table 1. The analogy between LGs/FOLs and meanings of words/uses of words 
SYNTHESIS	PHILOSOPHICA	
60	(2/2015)	pp.	(289–305)













other	hand,	 the	 interpretation	 reveals	Wittgenstein’s	hidden	assumption	 in	 the	 explication	of	
“meaning	as	use”	metaphor.	To	use	Derrida’s	famous	saying	that	“there	is	nothing	outside	of	
















2.1. Dependence of language-games on forms of life (PI 23)
Crucial	notions	in	PI	are	LGs	and	FOLs.	LGs	have	been	presented	by	Witt-




































Most	 of	 introductory	 books,	 dictionaries,	 analytic	 exegeses	 (Glock	 1996,	
McGinn	2000,	Stern	2004,	Baker	&	Hacker	2005)	and	papers	on	meaning	
and	use	in	Wittgenstein	generally	claim	that	the	meaning	is	use	of	a	word	in	
the	 language	 (Goldfarb	 1988,	Glock	 1996:376–81,	 Skorupski	 1999:29–59,	







meaning.”	(ROC	III	320)	and	“I know all that.	And	that	will	come	out	in	the	
way	I	act,	and	in	the	way	I	speak…”	(OC	395)	Some	Wittgenstein	scholars	
take	 these	 and	 similar	 remarks	 to	 be	 quite	 important,	 surely	more	 than	 an	
“aphorism”	(Malcolm’s	note).	 (a)	D.	Richter	 in	 the	dictionary	entry	claims	
that	 “Words,	 gestures,	 and	 expressions	 come	alive,	 as	 it	were,	 only	within	


















of	a	sort	(PI	66),	do not think	of	an	essence	(i.e.	meaning),	but look	how	it	
functions	(i.e.	 is	used).	For	one	who	is	not	familiar	with	tools	the	meaning	
of	a	hammer	or	nails	is	not	perspicuous	by	thinking	about	meaning	of	these	



































present	 moment	 of	 technological	 development)	 simply	 imitates	 actions	 of	
members	of	 a	FOL	 (in	 fact	 completely	different	kind	of	mistakes	occur	 in	
these	cases).
However,	what	is	a	philosopher’s	job	here?	He/she	does	essentially	the	same:	
observing	 and	describing	 actions	 and	phenomena	 and	 these	 are	 almost	 the	
























a	 natural	 language	 it	 must	 learn	 various	 practices	 in	 standard	 situations	 in	
which	various	uses	of	various	sentences	are	appropriate	in	terms	of	“everyday	
practices”	(PI	197,	208),	“training”,	and	“customs”	(PI	198).	The	“technique”	
in	PI	199	 is	so	 to	say	a	 technique	of	 living	a	human	life	(Baker	&	Hacker	




























































and	(b)	is	the similarity in understanding	order	and	an	action	as	the	appropri-
ate	response	to	the	order,	while	the	similarity	between	(a)	and	(c)	is	the	simi-
larity in explaining	of	the	word/complete	sign	meaning.	The	first	similarity	
leads	to	discussion	on	the position of the sign in life,	while	the	second	leads	to	
the position of the sign in grammar	(as	shown	in	Table	3).	Now,	if	language	
is	an	instrument,	then	it	seems	doubtless	which	discussion	is	more	important.	
In	other	words,	concerning	meaning	(a)	seem	to	be	more	similar	to	our	word	































then	 this	 is	 relevant	 dissimilarity.	Wittgenstein	 seems	 to	 suggest	 that	 there	
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is	similarity,	and	it	is	the	similarity	in	use	if	the	manner	of	uttering	and	say	






































Table 2. The relation of meaning of a word, its use, and life 
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stein	 does	 not	 recognize	 anything	 surprising	 about	 it.	Wood	 turns	 over	 an	
infrared	photograph	while	simultaneously	claiming,	“This	is	what	you	look	
like	in	the	dark.”	Thus,	DI,	What	people	look	like	in	the	dark	is	asserted	and	





















































































Table 3. From Baker and Hacker 2005:148 
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Primat funkcije pred strukturom
Analogijsko	čitanje	Wittgensteinovog	aforizma	“Značenje	je	upotreba”
Sažetak
U članku autori ispituju Wittgensteinov stav “značenje riječi je njena upotreba u jeziku” pogla-
vito u kontekstu odjeljaka 23 i 43 Filozofijskih	istraživanja pod vidom nekih drugih odjeljaka 
(poput 199–199 i 209) te nekih utjecajnijih interpretacija ovih odlomaka. Autori smatraju da 
je slogan “značenje je upotreba” analogija. Također, djelomično prateći Bakera i Hackera 
(2005), tvrdi se da je taj slogan razumljiv samo u kontekstu ovisnosti jezičnih igara o oblicima 
života (šira interpretacija). Naime, značenje riječi je njena upotreba u jeziku samo ako ta upo-
treba ima mjesto u životu. Drugim riječima, da bismo razumjeli jezične igre, čini se prirodnim 
promatrati ih u njihovom prirodnom kontekstu oblika života kojima pripadaju. Stoga se tvrdnja 






Primat der Funktion über Struktur
Analogielesen von Wittgensteins Aphorismus „Bedeutung ist Gebrauch“
Zusammenfassung
In dem Artikel untersuchen die Autoren Wittgensteins Standpunkt „die Bedeutung eines Wortes 
ist sein Gebrauch in der Sprache“ hauptsächlich im Kontext der Abschnitte 23 und 43 der 
Philosophischen	Untersuchungen, im Lichte einiger anderer Abschnitte (nämlich 197–199 und 
209) sowie einiger einflussreicher Interpretationen dieser Passagen. Die Autoren behaupten, 
der Slogan „Bedeutung ist Gebrauch“ sei eine Analogie. Überdies vertreten sie die Ansicht, 
teilweise Baker und Hacker 2005 folgend, dieser Standpunkt sei begreiflich nur im Kontext der 
Abhängigkeit der Sprachspiele von den Lebensformen (breitere Interpretation). Die Bedeutung 
eines Wortes, nämlich, ist sein Gebrauch in der Sprache nur, wenn dieser Gebrauch einen Platz 
im Leben hat. Mit anderen Worten, um Sprachspiele zu verstehen, scheint es natürlich, sie in 
ihrem natürlichen Kontext der Lebensformen zu beobachten, denen sie zugehören. Demgemäß 
kann die Feststellung „Bedeutung ist Gebrauch“, gerade in diesen Interpretationsrichtungen, 
nur als Analogie bzw. Metapher verstanden werden.
Schlüsselwörter
Analogie,	 Lebensformen,	 Sprachspiele,	 die	Bedeutung	 eines	Wortes	 ist	 sein	Gebrauch,	Metapher,	
Ähnlichkeiten,	Gebrauch	eines	Wortes,	Ludwig	Wittgenstein,	Gordon	Baker	&	Peter	Hacker
Nicholas	Melville,	Kristijan	Krkač
Le primat de la fonction sur la structure
Une lecture analogique de l’aphorisme de Wittgenstein 
« La signification c’est l’usage »
Résumé
Cette article interroge le point de vue de Wittgenstein selon lequel « la signification d’un mot 
et son emploi dans le langage » principalement dans le contexte des sections 23 et 43 des 
Recherches	philosophiques, mais aussi à la lumière d’autres sections (telles que les sections 
197–199 et 209) et de d’autres interprétations influentes de ces passages. Les auteurs affirment 
que la devise « la signification c’est l’usage » est une analogie. De même, suivant partiellement 
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Baker et Hacker (2005), ils soutiennent que cette devise est compréhensible seulement dans 
un contexte où les jeux de mots entretiennent une dépendance avec les formes de vie (large 
interprétation). En effet, la signification des mots est son emploi dans la langue seulement si cet 
emploi a sa place dans la vie. Ainsi, l’affirmation selon laquelle « la signification c’est l’usage » 
peut se comprendre uniquement en tant qu’analogie ou métaphore, et cela précisément dans ces 
directions d’interprétations.
Mots-clés
analogie,	 formes	de	vie,	 jeux	de	mots,	 la	 signification	c’est	 l’usage,	métaphore,	 emploi	d’un	mot,	
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